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Vulnerabilities/CVE-2025-40048Public Intelligence Dossier
Source: Source type: NVD · Limited verification•Last verified: •Collection Degraded
CVE-2025-40048Unknown / EvaluatingHIGH (raw)CVSS 7.5

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: uio_hv_generic: Let userspace take care of interrupt mask Remove the logic to set interrupt mask by default in uio_hv_generic driver as the interrupt mask value is supposed to be controlled completely by the user space

Published: 28 Oct 2025•Last updated: 16 Oct 2026, 03:49 AM IST•Source identifier: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Dossier completeness: source-provided sections 1 / 3 · rule guidance available. Missing source facts count as incomplete.
Official source
CISA KEV catalog
Unknown
KEV status was not determined.
CVSS score
7.5HIGH (raw)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Metric source416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
EPSS probability
0.6%0.006
Percentile50th
Weakness type
—
No further CWE recorded
Remediation
Patch status unknown
No fixed version or KB recorded

Why It Matters

Analysis dossier

Why It Matters

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: uio_hv_generic: Let userspace take care of interrupt mask Remove the logic to set interrupt mask by default in uio_hv_generic driver as the interrupt mask value is supposed to be controlled completely by the user space. If the mask bit gets changed by the driver, concurrently with user mode operating on the ring, the mask bit may be set when it is supposed to be clear, and the user-mode driver will miss an interrupt which will cause a hang. For eg- when the driver sets inbound ring buffer interrupt mask to 1, the host does not interrupt the guest on the UIO VMBus channel. However, setting the mask does not prevent the host from putting a message in the inbound ring buffer. So let’s assume that happens, the host puts a message into the ring buffer but does not interrupt. Subsequently, the user space code in the guest sets the inbound ring buffer interrupt mask to 0, saying “Hey, I’m ready for interrupts”. User space code then calls pread() to wait for an interrupt. Then one of two things happens: * The host never sends another message. So the pread() waits forever. * The host does send another message. But because there’s already a message in the ring buffer, it doesn’t generate an interrupt. This is the correct behavior, because the host should only send an interrupt when the inbound ring buffer transitions from empty to not-empty. Adding an additional message to a ring buffer that is not empty is not supposed to generate an interrupt on the guest. Since the guest is waiting in pread() and not removing messages from the ring buffer, the pread() waits forever. This could be easily reproduced in hv_fcopy_uio_daemon if we delay setting interrupt mask to 0. Similarly if hv_uio_channel_cb() sets the interrupt_mask to 1, there’s a race condition. Once user space empties the inbound ring buffer, but before user space sets interrupt_mask to 0, the host could put another message in the ring buffer but it wouldn’t interrupt. Then the next pread() would hang. Fix these by removing all instances where interrupt_mask is changed, while keeping the one in set_event() unchanged to enable userspace control the interrupt mask by writing 0/1 to /dev/uioX.

SOC priority

High

Actively exploited

Unknown

Publicly disclosed

Unknown

Risk basis: SOC ecosystem technology relevance; HIGH severity; No confirmed exploitation signal in current enrichment

Affected Products & Remediation

0 source-backed products
Affected products and versions (source)Not provided by source
Recorded patch / KBNot provided by source

Vendor or catalog guidance (source)

Not provided by source

Known exploitation (source facts)

Only what a source states. Unknown means no source has said either way; it is not "not exploited".

CISA KEV
Unknown
Exploited (source statement)
Unknown
Publicly disclosed (source)
Unknown

Suggested hunting (rule-based inference)

SecOps Signal recommendation (rule-based inference). These steps are hunting hypotheses from the vulnerability class; they do not state or imply that exploitation occurred here or anywhere.

Matched network-unauthenticated (CVSS AV:N, CVSS PR:N, CVSS UI:N)

Exposure

  1. Identify devices reporting this CVE and note which expose the affected service to untrusted networks.Telemetry: DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities · A network-reachable, no-privilege vector makes internet-facing instances the first exposure question. · Rule network-unauthenticated

Exploitation evidence

  1. Review inbound connections to the affected service from unexpected sources since the advisory date.Telemetry: DeviceNetworkEvents · Hunting hypothesis from the CVSS vector; it does not show that exploitation occurred. · Rule network-unauthenticated

Response

  1. Confirm the source-stated update is installed and the CVE is no longer reported.Telemetry: DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities · A follow-up inventory check verifies remediation. · Rule network-unauthenticated

CISA KEV Record

CISA KEV status was not determined for this record.

Change History & Source Data

— No recorded material change

CNA / source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Record status · verification
UPDATED · NVD API
CPE
Unknown
Detection Hunting Query

— No published hunting query names this record. Browse community and library queries instead.

Correlated briefings

— No published briefing references this CVE

SecOps Signal surfaces public advisory facts only. A missing value means the source has not published it, not that your environment is unaffected. No tenant inventory is connected.