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Vulnerabilities/CVE-2026-43023Public Intelligence Dossier
Source: linux · Limited verification•Last verified: •Collection Degraded
CVE-2026-43023Unknown / EvaluatingHIGH (raw)CVSS 7.8CWE-362

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect() sco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding the socket lock

Published: 01 May 2026•Last updated: 16 Oct 2026, 09:47 PM IST•Source identifier: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Dossier completeness: source-provided sections 2 / 3 · rule guidance available. Missing source facts count as incomplete.
Official source
CISA KEV catalog
Unknown
KEV status was not determined.
CVSS score
7.8HIGH (raw)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Metric source416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
EPSS probability
0.1%0.001
Percentile1st
Weakness type
CWE-362
No further CWE recorded
Remediation
Patch status unknown
No fixed version or KB recorded

Why It Matters

Analysis dossier

Why It Matters

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect() sco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding the socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same socket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading to use-after-free. The buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed with additional logging instrumentation: Thread A (connect): HCI disconnect: Thread B (connect): sco_sock_connect(sk) sco_sock_connect(sk) sk_state==BT_OPEN sk_state==BT_OPEN (pass, no lock) (pass, no lock) sco_connect(sk): sco_connect(sk): hci_dev_lock hci_dev_lock hci_connect_sco <- blocked -> hcon1 sco_conn_add->conn1 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: conn1->sk = sk sk->conn = conn1 sk_state=BT_CONNECT release_sock hci_dev_unlock hci_dev_lock sco_conn_del: lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_del: sk->conn=NULL conn1->sk=NULL sk_state= BT_CLOSED SOCK_ZAPPED release_sock hci_dev_unlock (unblocked) hci_connect_sco -> hcon2 sco_conn_add -> conn2 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: sk->conn=conn2 sk_state= BT_CONNECT // zombie sk! release_sock hci_dev_unlock Thread B revives a BT_CLOSED + SOCK_ZAPPED socket back to BT_CONNECT. Subsequent cleanup triggers double sock_put() and use-after-free. Meanwhile conn1 is leaked as it was orphaned when sco_conn_del() cleared the association. Fix this by: - Moving lock_sock() before the sk_state/sk_type checks in sco_sock_connect() to serialize concurrent connect attempts - Fixing the sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET check to actually return the error instead of just assigning it - Adding a state re-check in sco_connect() after lock_sock() to catch state changes during the window between the locks - Adding sco_pi(sk)->conn check in sco_chan_add() to prevent double-attach of a socket to multiple connections - Adding hci_conn_drop() on sco_chan_add failure to prevent HCI connection leaks

SOC priority

High

Actively exploited

Unknown

Publicly disclosed

Unknown

Risk basis: SOC ecosystem technology relevance; HIGH severity; No confirmed exploitation signal in current enrichment

Affected Products & Remediation

1 source-backed product
Affected products and versions (source)
  • linux linux kernel · >= 6.1.109 < 6.1.168; >= 6.3.1 < 6.6.134; >= 6.7 < 6.12.81; >= 6.13 < 6.18.22; >= 6.19 < 6.19.12; 6.3; 7.0 · NVD CPE · Source
Recorded patch / KBNot provided by source

Vendor or catalog guidance (source)

Not provided by source

Known exploitation (source facts)

Only what a source states. Unknown means no source has said either way; it is not "not exploited".

CISA KEV
Unknown
Exploited (source statement)
Unknown
Publicly disclosed (source)
Unknown

Suggested hunting (rule-based inference)

SecOps Signal recommendation (rule-based inference). These steps are hunting hypotheses from the vulnerability class; they do not state or imply that exploitation occurred here or anywhere.

Matched local-privilege-escalation (CVSS AV:L, CVSS PR:L)

Exposure

  1. Identify hosts reporting this CVE, prioritising shared or multi-user systems.Telemetry: DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities · A local, low-privilege vector matters most where untrusted users can run code. · Rule local-privilege-escalation

Exploitation evidence

  1. Look for low-privileged processes spawning SYSTEM or root-level child processes on affected hosts.Telemetry: DeviceProcessEvents · Hunting hypothesis from the CVSS vector; privilege transitions are a focused starting point, not evidence of attack. · Rule local-privilege-escalation

Response

  1. Confirm the source-stated update on affected hosts.Telemetry: DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities · Host inventory can verify remediation. · Rule local-privilege-escalation

CISA KEV Record

CISA KEV status was not determined for this record.

Change History & Source Data

— No recorded material change

CNA / source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Record status · verification
UPDATED · NVD API
CPE
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.3:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*

Evidence & Provenance

3 public sources
git.kernel.orgSource recordnvd.nist.govSource recordgit.kernel.orgSource record
Detection Hunting Query

— No published hunting query names this record. Browse community and library queries instead.

Open KQL Library

Correlated briefings

— No published briefing references this CVE

SecOps Signal surfaces public advisory facts only. A missing value means the source has not published it, not that your environment is unaffected. No tenant inventory is connected.