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Vulnerabilities/CVE-2026-43194Public Intelligence Dossier
Source: linux · Limited verification•Last verified: •Collection Degraded
CVE-2026-43194Unknown / EvaluatingHIGH (raw)CVSS 7.5NVD-CWE-noinfo

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: consume xmit errors of GSO frames udpgro_frglist.sh and udpgro_bench.sh are the flakiest tests currently in NIPA

Published: 06 May 2026•Last updated: 16 Oct 2026, 09:47 PM IST•Source identifier: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Dossier completeness: source-provided sections 2 / 3 · rule guidance available. Missing source facts count as incomplete.
Official source
CISA KEV catalog
Unknown
KEV status was not determined.
CVSS score
7.5HIGH (raw)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Metric source416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
EPSS probability
0.8%0.008
Percentile54th
Weakness type
NVD-CWE-noinfo
No further CWE recorded
Remediation
Patch status unknown
No fixed version or KB recorded

Why It Matters

Analysis dossier

Why It Matters

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: consume xmit errors of GSO frames udpgro_frglist.sh and udpgro_bench.sh are the flakiest tests currently in NIPA. They fail in the same exact way, TCP GRO test stalls occasionally and the test gets killed after 10min. These tests use veth to simulate GRO. They attach a trivial ("return XDP_PASS;") XDP program to the veth to force TSO off and NAPI on. Digging into the failure mode we can see that the connection is completely stuck after a burst of drops. The sender's snd_nxt is at sequence number N [1], but the receiver claims to have received (rcv_nxt) up to N + 3 * MSS [2]. Last piece of the puzzle is that senders rtx queue is not empty (let's say the block in the rtx queue is at sequence number N - 4 * MSS [3]). In this state, sender sends a retransmission from the rtx queue with a single segment, and sequence numbers N-4*MSS:N-3*MSS [3]. Receiver sees it and responds with an ACK all the way up to N + 3 * MSS [2]. But sender will reject this ack as TCP_ACK_UNSENT_DATA because it has no recollection of ever sending data that far out [1]. And we are stuck. The root cause is the mess of the xmit return codes. veth returns an error when it can't xmit a frame. We end up with a loss event like this: ------------------------------------------------- | GSO super frame 1 | GSO super frame 2 | |-----------------------------------------------| | seg | seg | seg | seg | seg | seg | seg | seg | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | ------------------------------------------------- x ok ok | ok ok ok \\ snd_nxt "x" means packet lost by veth, and "ok" means it went thru. Since veth has TSO disabled in this test it sees individual segments. Segment 1 is on the retransmit queue and will be resent. So why did the sender not advance snd_nxt even tho it clearly did send up to seg 8? tcp_write_xmit() interprets the return code from the core to mean that data has not been sent at all. Since TCP deals with GSO super frames, not individual segment the crux of the problem is that loss of a single segment can be interpreted as loss of all. TCP only sees the last return code for the last segment of the GSO frame (in <> brackets in the diagram above). Of course for the problem to occur we need a setup or a device without a Qdisc. Otherwise Qdisc layer disconnects the protocol layer from the device errors completely. We have multiple ways to fix this. 1) make veth not return an error when it lost a packet. While this is what I think we did in the past, the issue keeps reappearing and it's annoying to debug. The game of whack a mole is not great. 2) fix the damn return codes We only talk about NETDEV_TX_OK and NETDEV_TX_BUSY in the documentation, so maybe we should make the return code from ndo_start_xmit() a boolean. I like that the most, but perhaps some ancient, not-really-networking protocol would suffer. 3) make TCP ignore the errors It is not entirely clear to me what benefit TCP gets from interpreting the result of ip_queue_xmit()? Specifically once the connection is established and we're pushing data - packet loss is just packet loss? 4) this fix Ignore the rc in the Qdisc-less+GSO case, since it's unreliable. We already always return OK in the TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS case. In the Qdisc-less case let's be a bit more conservative and only mask the GSO errors. This path is taken by non-IP-"networks" like CAN, MCTP etc, so we could regress some ancient thing. This is the simplest, but also maybe the hackiest fix? Similar fix has been proposed by Eric in the past but never committed because original reporter was working with an OOT driver and wasn't providing feedback (see Link).

SOC priority

High

Actively exploited

Unknown

Publicly disclosed

Unknown

Risk basis: SOC ecosystem technology relevance; HIGH severity; No confirmed exploitation signal in current enrichment

Affected Products & Remediation

1 source-backed product
Affected products and versions (source)
  • linux linux kernel · >= 3.18 < 5.10.252; >= 5.11 < 5.15.202; >= 5.16 < 6.1.165; >= 6.2 < 6.6.128; >= 6.7 < 6.12.75; >= 6.13 < 6.18.16; >= 6.19 < 6.19.6; 7.0 · NVD CPE · Source
Recorded patch / KBNot provided by source

Vendor or catalog guidance (source)

Not provided by source

Known exploitation (source facts)

Only what a source states. Unknown means no source has said either way; it is not "not exploited".

CISA KEV
Unknown
Exploited (source statement)
Unknown
Publicly disclosed (source)
Unknown

Suggested hunting (rule-based inference)

SecOps Signal recommendation (rule-based inference). These steps are hunting hypotheses from the vulnerability class; they do not state or imply that exploitation occurred here or anywhere.

Matched network-unauthenticated (CVSS AV:N, CVSS PR:N, CVSS UI:N)

Exposure

  1. Identify devices reporting this CVE and note which expose the affected service to untrusted networks.Telemetry: DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities · A network-reachable, no-privilege vector makes internet-facing instances the first exposure question. · Rule network-unauthenticated

Exploitation evidence

  1. Review inbound connections to the affected service from unexpected sources since the advisory date.Telemetry: DeviceNetworkEvents · Hunting hypothesis from the CVSS vector; it does not show that exploitation occurred. · Rule network-unauthenticated

Response

  1. Confirm the source-stated update is installed and the CVE is no longer reported.Telemetry: DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities · A follow-up inventory check verifies remediation. · Rule network-unauthenticated

CISA KEV Record

CISA KEV status was not determined for this record.

Change History & Source Data

— No recorded material change

CNA / source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Record status · verification
UPDATED · NVD API
CPE
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
Detection Hunting Query

— No published hunting query names this record. Browse community and library queries instead.

Correlated briefings

— No published briefing references this CVE

SecOps Signal surfaces public advisory facts only. A missing value means the source has not published it, not that your environment is unaffected. No tenant inventory is connected.