In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ata: libata-scsi: fix DSM TRIM for sector sizes larger than 2048 bytes ata_scsi_write_same_xlat() translates a SCSI WRITE SAME command with the UNMAP bit set into an ATA DATA SET MANAGEMENT TRIM command
Why It Matters
Analysis dossierWhy It Matters
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ata: libata-scsi: fix DSM TRIM for sector sizes larger than 2048 bytes ata_scsi_write_same_xlat() translates a SCSI WRITE SAME command with the UNMAP bit set into an ATA DATA SET MANAGEMENT TRIM command. The TRIM descriptor is built by ata_format_dsm_trim_descr() into the 2048-byte ata_scsi_rbuf staging buffer, and the number of bytes copied is compared against the logical sector size by the caller: size = ata_format_dsm_trim_descr(scmd, trmax, block, n_block); if (size != len) /* len == sdp->sector_size */ goto invalid_param_len; ata_format_dsm_trim_descr() clamps the copy length to ATA_SCSI_RBUF_SIZE (2048). On a device whose logical sector size exceeds that (e.g. a 4Kn device, where sector_size == 4096) the function can never return more than 2048, while the caller expects it to return sector_size. The comparison therefore always fails, so every TRIM is rejected with "Parameter list length error" and WARN_ON() splats on each attempt. TRIM / discard is thus completely broken on such devices. The descriptor was incorrectly sized from the logical sector size. A DSM TRIM payload is a list of 512-byte pages, each holding up to ATA_MAX_TRIM_RNUM (64) LBA Range Entries, and is independent of the logical sector size. The Block Limits VPD page already advertises a single such page as the maximum WRITE SAME length (65535 * ATA_MAX_TRIM_RNUM logical blocks), so the block layer never sends a request that needs more than one page. Emit exactly one 512-byte page, independent of the logical sector size, and transfer only that page (COUNT == 1). For a 512-byte-sector device this is unchanged; devices with larger logical sectors now work instead of failing every TRIM.
High
Unknown
Unknown
Risk basis: SOC ecosystem technology relevance; HIGH severity; No confirmed exploitation signal in current enrichment
Affected Products & Remediation
0 source-backed productsVendor or catalog guidance (source)
Not provided by source
Known exploitation (source facts)
Only what a source states. Unknown means no source has said either way; it is not "not exploited".
- CISA KEV
- Unknown
- Exploited (source statement)
- Unknown
- Publicly disclosed (source)
- Unknown
Suggested hunting (rule-based inference)
SecOps Signal recommendation (rule-based inference). These steps are hunting hypotheses from the vulnerability class; they do not state or imply that exploitation occurred here or anywhere.
Matched network-unauthenticated (CVSS AV:N, CVSS PR:N, CVSS UI:N)
Exposure
- Identify devices reporting this CVE and note which expose the affected service to untrusted networks.Telemetry: DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities · A network-reachable, no-privilege vector makes internet-facing instances the first exposure question. · Rule network-unauthenticated
Exploitation evidence
- Review inbound connections to the affected service from unexpected sources since the advisory date.Telemetry: DeviceNetworkEvents · Hunting hypothesis from the CVSS vector; it does not show that exploitation occurred. · Rule network-unauthenticated
Response
- Confirm the source-stated update is installed and the CVE is no longer reported.Telemetry: DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities · A follow-up inventory check verifies remediation. · Rule network-unauthenticated
CISA KEV Record
CISA KEV status was not determined for this record.
Change History & Source Data
— No recorded material change
- CNA / source
- 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- Record status · verification
- UPDATED · NVD API
- CPE
- Unknown
Evidence & Provenance
— No published hunting query names this record. Browse community and library queries instead.
Correlated briefings
— No published briefing references this CVE