In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB read/write from unvalidated DataOffset in coalesce_t2() coalesce_t2() computes data pointers directly from server-supplied DataOffset fields with no validation against buffer bounds: data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt; ..
Why It Matters
Analysis dossierWhy It Matters
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB read/write from unvalidated DataOffset in coalesce_t2() coalesce_t2() computes data pointers directly from server-supplied DataOffset fields with no validation against buffer bounds: data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt; ... memcpy(data_area_of_tgt, data_area_of_src, total_in_src); A small DataOffset can push a pointer below the actual byte area, overwriting header fields; a large one can push it past the buffer end, causing out-of-bounds heap reads (source) or writes (target). The BCC overflow guard does not prevent this: BCC reflects how much data is present, while DataOffset controls where in the buffer it starts. The "validate target area" comment present since the function was first written in 2005 was a placeholder that was never implemented. Add lower- and upper-bound checks for both data pointers before the memcpy, and before any target header fields are modified.
High Severity / Review
Unknown
Unknown
Risk basis: SOC ecosystem technology relevance; CRITICAL severity; Critical CVSS without confirmed KEV exploitation
Affected Products & Remediation
0 source-backed productsVendor or catalog guidance (source)
Not provided by source
Known exploitation (source facts)
Only what a source states. Unknown means no source has said either way; it is not "not exploited".
- CISA KEV
- Unknown
- Exploited (source statement)
- Unknown
- Publicly disclosed (source)
- Unknown
Suggested hunting (rule-based inference)
SecOps Signal recommendation (rule-based inference). These steps are hunting hypotheses from the vulnerability class; they do not state or imply that exploitation occurred here or anywhere.
Matched network-unauthenticated (CVSS AV:N, CVSS PR:N, CVSS UI:N)
Exposure
- Identify devices reporting this CVE and note which expose the affected service to untrusted networks.Telemetry: DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities · A network-reachable, no-privilege vector makes internet-facing instances the first exposure question. · Rule network-unauthenticated
Exploitation evidence
- Review inbound connections to the affected service from unexpected sources since the advisory date.Telemetry: DeviceNetworkEvents · Hunting hypothesis from the CVSS vector; it does not show that exploitation occurred. · Rule network-unauthenticated
Response
- Confirm the source-stated update is installed and the CVE is no longer reported.Telemetry: DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities · A follow-up inventory check verifies remediation. · Rule network-unauthenticated
CISA KEV Record
CISA KEV status was not determined for this record.
Change History & Source Data
— No recorded material change
- CNA / source
- 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- Record status · verification
- UPDATED · NVD API
- CPE
- Unknown
Evidence & Provenance
— No published hunting query names this record. Browse community and library queries instead.
Correlated briefings
— No published briefing references this CVE