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Vulnerabilities/CVE-2026-99033Public Intelligence Dossier
Source: Microsoft · Limited verification•Last verified: •Collection Degraded
CVE-2026-99033Unknown / EvaluatingModerate (raw)CVSS 4.4

net/packet: guard the ll header push in packet_rcv_spkt()

Published: 25 Oct 2026•Last updated: 01 Nov 2026, 08:34 PM IST•Source identifier: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Dossier completeness: source-provided sections 3 / 3 · rule guidance not available. Missing source facts count as incomplete.
Official source
CISA KEV catalog
Unknown
KEV status was not determined.
CVSS score
4.4Moderate (raw)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Metric sourceMicrosoft MSRC CVRF
EPSS probability
0.2%0.002
Percentile8th
Weakness type
—
No further CWE recorded
Remediation
Patch status unknown
No fixed version or KB recorded

Why It Matters

Analysis dossier

Why It Matters

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/packet: guard the ll header push in packet_rcv_spkt() packet_rcv_spkt() restores the link layer header with skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb)); That subtraction is only meaningful when the device actually has a link layer header. packet_rcv() and tpacket_rcv() both wrap it in dev_has_header(), which is also the predicate the block comment at the top of the file states the restore in terms of; packet_rcv_spkt() does not. commit d549699048b4 ("net/packet: fix packet receive on L3 devices without visible hard header") introduced the helper and changed the two call sites, and this one stayed behind. A device without a visible ll header can leave skb->mac_header at the 0xFFFF sentinel that __alloc_skb() initialises it to. A CAN skb does: init_can_skb() sets pkt_type and ip_summed but does not reset the headers, and commit 9f10374bb024 ("can: remove private CAN skb headroom infrastructure") dropped the skb_reset_*_header() calls that used to be there. skb_mac_header() is then 0xFFFF, the length becomes a large negative number and skb_push() reports it through skb_under_panic() -- from softirq context, so it is a full system panic even with panic_on_oops=0: skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8bd21bc1 len:-65455 put:-65471 head:... data:... tail:0x50 end:0x180 dev:can0 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x50/0x60 Call Trace: skb_push+0x38/0x40 packet_rcv_spkt+0xe1/0x170 __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x7e8/0xd30 ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt The socket type is reachable: packet_create() accepts SOCK_PACKET alongside SOCK_RAW and SOCK_DGRAM behind the same CAP_NET_RAW check, and neither the socket length nor a capability check keeps it away from a CAN interface. The missing skb_reset_*_header() calls in init_can_skb() are a regression in their own right and are being fixed separately, but a packet socket should not turn a link layer that did not initialise its mac header into a kernel panic. Guard the push the way the other two receive paths do. Tested on v7.3-rc5 under QEMU with a slcan device on a pty, which is the driver RX path: vcan does not reproduce it, because can_send() resets the headers on the way out. One SOCK_PACKET socket bound to can0 and one frame written into the line discipline panics an unpatched kernel with the trace above; the same image with this patch prints no panic and powers off normally. Both kernels are this tree, defconfig plus CONFIG_CAN_SLCAN=y, differing only in this hunk.

SOC priority

Medium

Actively exploited (source statement)

Unknown

Publicly disclosed

Unknown

Risk basis: Microsoft or Microsoft-managed product relevance

Affected Products & Remediation

2 source-backed products
Affected products and versions (source)
  • azl3 kernel 6.6.159.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 · version range not provided by source · Microsoft MSRC · Source
  • azl3 kernel 6.6.157.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 · version range not provided by source · Microsoft MSRC · Source
Recorded patch / KBNot provided by source

Vendor or catalog guidance (source)

  • Microsoft MSRC: Release Notes

Known exploitation (source facts)

Only what a source states. Unknown means no source has said either way; it is not "not exploited".

CISA KEV
Unknown
Exploited (source statement)
Unknown
Publicly disclosed (source)
Unknown

Suggested hunting (rule-based inference)

SecOps Signal recommendation (rule-based inference). These steps are hunting hypotheses from the vulnerability class; they do not state or imply that exploitation occurred here or anywhere.

No rule-based guidance for this vulnerability class

CISA KEV Record

CISA KEV status was not determined for this record.

Change History & Source Data

— No recorded material change

CNA / source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Record status · verification
UPDATED · NVD API
CPE
Unknown

Linked by the query's stored exact CVE association. Review required tables and validation status before use.

Detection Hunting Query
Target: DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities•Defender XDR
Detect endpoints exposed to CVE-2026-99033
Purpose: Exposure assessment (Category: Exposure Check)Why linked: Query metadata names CVE-2026-99033
DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities| where CveId == "CVE-2026-99033"| project DeviceId, DeviceName, OSPlatform, OSVersion, SoftwareVendor, SoftwareName, SoftwareVersion, CveId, VulnerabilitySeverityLevel, RecommendedSecurityUpdate, RecommendedSecurityUpdateId| sort by VulnerabilitySeverityLevel desc
Schema Checked · Not runtime validatedSource: SecOps Signal deterministic template · Limited verificationStatic screening: Passed structure and schema checks; tenant execution is not verified.

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SecOps Signal surfaces public advisory facts only. A missing value means the source has not published it, not that your environment is unaffected. No tenant inventory is connected.